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PROPERTY IN INSOLVENT ESTATES – EDKINS v REGISTRAR OF DEEDS, 
FOURIE v EDKINS, AND MOTALA v MOLLER 
RG Evans* and L Steyn** 
1 Introduction 
Granting a sequestration order has the immediate result that the insolvent's property 
vests in the Master and later in the trustee of the insolvent estate.1 If the insolvent 
has a "spouse", as defined in section 21(13) of the Insolvency Act,2 the property of 
that spouse also vests in the Master, and subsequently the trustee, "as if it were 
property of the sequestrated estate".3 In three recent judgments, including one of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, issues relating to property that forms part of an 
insolvent estate or which belongs to the "solvent spouse" as well as the rights of a 
trustee in respect of such property arose and were dealt with within the confines of 
the relevant provisions of the Insolvency Act. However, a question that was 
pertinent but which was not considered in any of these cases related to the status of 
such property. In this respect the vesting provisions in sections 20 and 21 of the 
Insolvency Act4 are of importance. The cases concerned are Edkins v Registrar of 
Deeds, Johannesburg,5 and, on appeal, Fourie v Edkins,6 as well as the separate 
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1  Section 20 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (hereafter "the Act" or "the Insolvency Act"). 
2  Hereafter the "solvent spouse". 
3  Section 21(13) of the Insolvency Act provides that the word "spouse" means "not only a wife or 
husband in the legal sense, but also a wife or husband by virtue of a marriage according to any 
law or custom, and also a woman living with a man as his wife or a man living with a woman as 
her husband, although not married to one another". It is submitted that since the 
commencement of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 on 30 November 2006, the definition of the 
term "spouse" in the Insolvency Act has by implication been amended to include persons of the 
same sex or of the opposite sex who have entered into a civil union. 
4  See generally Evans Assets of Insolvent Estates 207 where the nature of the vesting of the 
property of the insolvent and of the solvent spouse, first in the Master and, upon his 
appointment, in the trustee, was considered. 
5  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds, Johannesburg 2012 6 SA 278 (GSJ) (hereafter Edkins v Registrar of 
Deeds). 
6  Fourie v Edkins 2013 6 SA 576 (SCA) (hereafter Fourie v Edkins). 
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case of Motala v Moller.7 Before considering these judgments, however, the position 
regarding vesting and the dominium of property in insolvent estates will be briefly 
considered. 
2 Ownership of property vesting in the trustee 
The ownership of property forming part of an insolvent estate and its vesting in the 
Master of the high court and in the trustee upon the latter's appointment have been 
the source of academic debate and conflicting court judgments over a lengthy 
period.8 The question was always who owns and/or controls the property that forms 
part of an insolvent estate. As will be shown here, the answer to this question is 
vitally important in practice, particularly where the ownership of immovable property 
is in dispute in an insolvent estate. Answering the question is often crucial, 
particularly for third parties who enter into transactions with insolvent persons 
and/or their spouses. The answer is also significant not only in relation to the 
trustee's election to proceed with or to repudiate executory contracts,9 but also in 
respect of the ranking of creditors. It may also determine the proprietary status of 
assets that ostensibly belong to the solvent spouse at the moment of sequestration 
of the insolvent spouse's estate. This question is of further practical importance 
because its answer may guide the actions of debtors, creditors and trustees in 
insolvent estates. 
In this discussion the authors consider issues relating to the dominium of property in 
insolvent estates. It was thought that the question of the dominium of property in an 
insolvent estate had been finally settled by the (then) Appellate Division in De Villiers 
                                        
7  Motala v Moller (GSJ) unreported case number 32654/11 (GSJ) of 11 September 2013 (copy on 
file with authors) (hereafter Motala v Moller). 
8  See Joubert 1992 TSAR 699-706; Evans 1996 TSAR 719-724; Stander 1996 THRHR 388-398; 
Evans 1996 THRHR 613-625; Evans 1997 THRHR 71-83; Evans 1998 Stell LR 359-372; Evans 
Assets of Insolvent Estates; Bertelsmann et al Mars The Law of Insolvency 212 n 50. See also 
Stand 382 Saxonwold v Kruger 1990 4 SA 317 (T); Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) 
(hereafter Harksen v Lane). 
9  These are contracts which the insolvent or the solvent spouse, as the case may be, had entered 
into prior to sequestration, but the performance in terms of which had not been completely 
carried out at the time of sequestration. 
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v Delta Cables.10 Thereafter, the Constitutional Court, in Harksen v Lane,11 with 
reference to De Villiers v Delta Cables, accepted that the ownership of the property 
of the solvent spouse passed to the Master and subsequently to the trustee.12 
Notably, the South African Law Reform Commission in its Report on the Review of 
the Law of Insolvency13 issued in 2000, in the proposed "vesting provision", clause 
11 of the Draft Insolvency Bill,14 employed wording similar to that used in section 20 
of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. In its memorandum to this Draft Bill15 it stated: 
"Notwithstanding views to the contrary …, the existing rule does not give rise to any 
problems, except perhaps problems related to section 21."16 
However, the judgments handed down in the cases under discussion here have 
seemingly again opened up the question for debate, particularly in view of the fact 
that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Fourie v Edkins ignored its own precedent on 
this issue. Further, in Motala v Moller, the Gauteng South High Court, per Myburgh 
AJ, apparently sought to align or reconcile sections 21 and 25(4) with each other. 
However, in doing so it failed to apply the principle laid down in De Villiers v Delta 
Cables regarding the dominium of the property of an insolvent estate, which, in the 
authors' opinion, resulted in an incorrect judgment. 
To place the ensuing discussion regarding the ownership of the assets in insolvent 
estates in context, the vesting provisions in sections 20 and 21 of the Act are quoted 
as follows: 
20  Effect of sequestration on insolvent's property 
(1) The effect of the sequestration of the estate of an insolvent shall be –  
(a)  to divest the insolvent of his estate and to vest it in the Master until a trustee 
has been appointed, and, upon the appointment of a trustee, to vest the estate in 
him; 
                                        
10  De Villiers v Delta Cables (Pty) Ltd 1992 1 SA 9 (A) (hereafter De Villiers v Delta Cables); Evans 
1996 TSAR 719; Evans 1998 Stell LR 359. 
11  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC). 
12  Harksen v Lane para 35. 
13  SALRC 2000 http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj63_insolv_2000apr.pdf (Report on the 
Review of the Law of Insolvency). 
14  See Report on the Review of the Law of Insolvency Vol 1; clause 11 of the Draft Insolvency Bill. 
15  See Report on the Review of the Law of Insolvency Vol 2 39 para 11.1. 
16  This was stated with specific reference to Stander 1996 THRHR 388 and Evans 1996 TSAR 719. 
(In the Draft Insolvency Bill the term "liquidation" is used instead of "sequestration" and the 
term "liquidator" is used instead of "trustee".) 
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(b) to stay, until the appointment of a trustee, any civil proceedings instituted by or 
against the insolvent save such proceedings as may, in terms of section twenty-
three, be instituted by the insolvent for his own benefit or be instituted against the 
insolvent: Provided that if any claim which formed the subject of legal proceedings 
against the insolvent which were so stayed, has been proved and admitted against 
the insolvent's estate in terms of section forty-four or seventy-eight, the claimant 
may also prove against the estate a claim for his taxed costs, incurred in connection 
with those proceedings before the sequestration of the insolvent's estate; 
(c) as soon as any sheriff or messenger, whose duty it is to execute any judgment 
given against an insolvent, becomes aware of the sequestration of the insolvent's 
estate, to stay that execution, unless the court otherwise directs; 
(d) to empower the insolvent, if in prison for debt, to apply to the court for his 
release, after notice to the creditor at whose suit he is so imprisoned, and to 
empower the court to order his release, on such conditions as it may think fit to 
impose. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) the estate of an insolvent shall include – 
(a) all property of the insolvent at the date of the sequestration, including property 
or the proceeds thereof which are in the hands of a sheriff or a messenger under 
writ of attachment;  
(b) all property which the insolvent may acquire or which may accrue to him during 
the sequestration, except as otherwise provided in section twenty-three. 
21 Effect of sequestration on property of spouse of insolvent 
(1) The additional effect of the sequestration of the separate estate of one of two 
spouses who are not living apart under a judicial order of separation shall be to 
vest in the Master, until a trustee has been appointed, and, upon the appointment 
of a trustee, to vest in him all the property (including property or the proceeds 
thereof which are in the hands of a sheriff or a messenger under a writ of 
attachment) of the spouse whose estate has not been sequestrated (hereinafter 
referred to as the solvent spouse) as if it were property of the sequestrated estate, 
and to empower the Master or trustee to deal with such property accordingly, but 
subject to the following provisions of this section. 
Case law and academic opinion regarding the nature of the vesting of the property 
of an insolvent or a solvent spouse17 in the Master and/or the trustee was 
inconsistent.18 However, in De Villiers v Delta Cables Van Heerden JA held: 
It has always been accepted that a trustee becomes the owner of the property of 
the insolvent. The legislature did not say so in so many words, but the transfer of 
dominium is clearly inherent in the terminology employed in section 20 (1) (a) 
which provides that a sequestration order shall divest the insolvent of his estate 
and vest it first in the Master and later in the trustee ... Section 21 (1) employs very 
much the same terminology.19 
                                        
17  See Evans Assets of Insolvent Estates ch 10 for a detailed discussion of the effect of 
sequestration on the spouse of the insolvent. 
18  See works and cases cited at n 8 above. 
19  De Villiers v Delta Cables 15G-H. As stated above, this was accepted by the Constitutional Court 
in Harksen v Lane. In Beddy v Van der Westhuizen 1999 3 SA 913 (SCA) 916A-C the court per 
RG EVANS AND L STEYN PER / PELJ 2014(17)6 
2750 
 
This ruling of the Appellate Division concentrated on the meaning and effect of section 
21 of the Act. The facts of this case, presented in chronological sequence, are as 
follows. Mr and Mrs Mathews (M) were married out of community of property. On 22 
February 1986 they entered into a contract of suretyship in favour of Delta Cables 
(Pty) Ltd ("Delta Cables"), the respondent. This deed of suretyship secured debts 
which one VH Cables (Pty) Ltd owed to Delta Cables. Five days later Mrs M signed a 
power of attorney to register a surety mortgage bond over immovable property that 
was to be purchased by her at a later date. Delta Cables was the prospective 
mortgagee. This property was indeed purchased and registered in Mrs M's name on 
21 May 1986. On 17 June 1986 the estate of Mr M was provisionally sequestrated 
and a final order was granted on 29 June 1986. On 24 September 1986 the 
appellant was appointed trustee in the insolvent estate. On 1 October 1986 the 
surety mortgage bond was registered over the property. Delta Cables had caused this 
to occur by virtue of the power of attorney referred to above. Delta Cables later 
obtained judgment, which was founded on the deed of suretyship, against Mrs M. The 
trustee was unaware of these facts until shortly before the sale in execution was to 
occur. Agreement was reached by the parties that, after satisfying the claim of a first 
mortgage bond holder, the net proceeds would be paid to the trustee (the appellant). 
Delta Cables then proved a claim as a secured creditor in the insolvent estate, based 
on the judgment obtained against Mrs M and relying on the surety mortgage bond as 
security for its claim. 
The trustee disputed Delta Cables' status as a secured creditor. He applied to the 
Witwatersrand Local Division for an order declaring it a concurrent creditor, 
contending that the bond registered after the sequestration of Mr M's estate and 
without his (the trustee's) consent conferred no preference on Delta Cables in 
respect of its claim. The lower court rejected this argument. It ruled that despite the 
provisions of section 21, the trustee would have been obliged to allow the 
                                                                                                                          
Schultz JA held that: "The purpose of s 21 is to 'prevent or at least to hamper collusion between 
spouses to the detriment of creditors of the insolvent spouse' (as Van Heerden JA put it in De 
Villiers NO v Delta Cables (Pty) Ltd 1992 (1) SA 9 (A) at 13I); and, viewed from the other angle, 
'to ensure that property which properly belonged to the insolvent ends up in the estate' (as 
Goldstone J put it in Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at 318E)." 
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registration of the bond because the power of attorney had been validly executed 
prior to the sequestration. The trustee appealed against this decision. 
In the Appellate Division Delta Cables argued that in terms of section 21 ownership of 
the solvent spouse's assets did not pass to the trustee. To support this contention it 
relied on certain provisions in the Act which indicate that an insolvent's property should 
be treated differently from that of the solvent spouse. For example, section 20(1)(b) 
stays civil proceedings regarding the insolvent until the appointment of a trustee, 
whereas no such provision exists in respect of the solvent spouse's property. 
Furthermore, the execution of judgments against the insolvent are stayed, but not so 
regarding the solvent spouse.20 Lastly, the contractual capacity of the solvent spouse is 
not limited by section 23(2) of the Act. 
Van Heerden JA rejected these arguments. He found that one must distinguish between 
assets that fell within and those that fell outside of the meaning of section 21. He ruled 
that the solvent spouse could obtain an estate consisting of released (re-vested) assets21 
and assets acquired after the sequestration order. The solvent spouse maintained 
contractual capacity in respect of these two categories of assets only. The argument that 
dominium had not passed, he said, was valid only in respect of the latter two categories 
of assets that fell outside the ambit of the limitations of section 21. Nothing militated 
against the intention that dominium in the assets of the solvent spouse that are included 
within the limitations set by section 21 vested in the trustee. The court held further that 
the provisions or the absence of provisions upon which Delta Cables relied simply 
showed that some of the provisions of the Act pertaining to an insolvent and his or her 
assets were not applicable to the solvent spouse and his or her assets.22 As a result the 
court held that these provisions had no bearing on the question of whether or not the 
trustee became the owner of Mrs M's property. None of these provisions militated 
against a construction that dominium in the assets of the solvent spouse vests in the 
trustee. 
                                        
20  Section 20(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act. 
21  See s 21(2) of the Insolvency Act. 
22  De Villiers v Delta Cables 15B-D. 
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In the majority judgment in Harksen v Lane the Constitutional Court held that the 
purpose and effect of section 21 is "not to divest, save temporarily, the solvent 
spouse of the ownership of property that is in fact his or hers" and that "the purpose 
is to ensure that the insolvent estate is not deprived of property to which it is 
entitled."23 Therefore, it would appear that ownership even of those assets that 
belonged to the solvent spouse at the moment of sequestration and that are 
ultimately released to him or her pursuant to section 21(2) or section 21(4) passes 
temporarily to the Master and, upon appointment, to the trustee. 
To bring the case discussions that will follow into context regarding the ownership of 
assets forming part of an insolvent estate, it is appropriate at this point specifically to 
consider the effect of section 20(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act, as quoted above. It 
provides that the sequestration of a debtor's estate automatically stays, unless the 
court directs otherwise, the execution of a judgment that was granted against the 
debtor before the sequestration of his or her estate. The stay is effected as soon as 
the sheriff whose duty it is to execute the judgment becomes aware of the 
sequestration.24 This provision applies irrespective of the stage which the execution 
process has reached, unless it has been completed.25 If the sale in execution has 
been completed before sequestration but the delivery of the relevant property to the 
purchaser has not yet occurred, the result of sequestration is that the property 
under attachment, which is in the hands of the deputy-sheriff or messenger, and the 
proceeds of the sale in execution of such property which are in his hands, vest/s in 
the Master and later, upon his appointment, in the trustee.26 Therefore, for the 
purchaser's right to delivery to be enforced and to allow delivery to ensue the court 
must in its discretion lift the automatic stay.27 
It is against the background of these principles in respect of the ownership of estate 
property and insolvency legislation that the judgments of Edkins v Registrar of Deeds, 
                                        
23  Harksen v Lane para 35. 
24  Section 20(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act. 
25  Bertelsmann et al Mars The Law of Insolvency para 8.8; Meskin Insolvency Law 6.1. 
26  Section 20(1)(a) read with s 20(2)(a) of the Insolvency Act; Simpson v Klein 1987 1 SA 405 (W) 
412 (hereafter Simpson v Klein). 
27  Section 20(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act. 
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Fourie v Edkins and Motala v Moller will now be considered. 
3 Edkins v Registrar of Deeds; Fourie v Edkins ("the Edkins judgments") 
3.1 The issue and the facts 
The judgment in Edkins v Registrar of Deeds, which was overruled by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in an appeal by the trustees of the insolvent estate in Fourie v 
Edkins,28 concerned an application by Edkins, a businessman in the residential 
property market, for an order declaring him to be entitled to the transfer of certain 
immovable property. Edkins had purchased the immovable property at a sale in 
execution conducted by the sheriff of the High Court, Johannesburg, at the instance 
of the mortgagee, Absa Bank (Pty) Ltd, pursuant to a judgment obtained by the 
latter against the registered owner and mortgagor of the property, Mthethwa, who 
had defaulted in respect of bond instalments due. Subsequent to its sale in 
execution, but prior to its transfer, Mthethwa had published a notice of intention to 
surrender his estate in terms of section 4(1) of the Insolvency Act and his estate 
was thereafter sequestrated. Edkins had complied with all of his obligations in terms 
of the sale. The joint trustees of the insolvent estate ("the trustees") opposed the 
application.29 
It was not disputed that Edkins had been completely unaware of the voluntary 
surrender of the insolvent's estate, its acceptance by the high court, and/or the 
subsequent appointment of the trustees in the estate. The sheriff too was not aware 
of these facts.30 On 3 August 2010 Edkins instructed conveyancers to lodge the 
transfer documents in the offices of the Registrar of Deeds so that the immovable 
                                        
28  Hereafter the judgments will be collectively referred to, where appropriate, as "the Edkins 
judgments". 
29  The joint trustees were the third and fourth respondents in the matter. (There appears to be 
some confusion in the judgments concerning the date of their appointment. This, however, has 
no significant implications for this discussion.) The first respondent was the Registrar of Deeds, 
Johannesburg; the second respondent was the Master of the High Court, Johannesburg; the fifth 
respondent was Absa Bank (Pty) Ltd (hereafter "Absa Bank"); the sixth respondent was the 
sheriff of the High Court, Johannesburg ("the sheriff"), who had conducted the sale in execution. 
The applicant sought relief only against the trustees. 
30  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 4.4. 
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property could be transferred into his name. However, the conveyancers 
subsequently advised him that they were unable to do so because of the Registrar of 
Deeds' Conference Resolution regarding the transfer of a property after a sale in 
execution, where the debtor was sequestrated after the date of sale in execution. 
This Resolution, 54/2009, reads as follows: 
If property was sold in execution and debtor is sequestrated after such sale, does 
the sequestration prevent the sheriff from transferring the property to the 
purchaser of the sale in execution? 
Resolution: Yes. 
The Registrar further resolved that "once the sequestration order has been granted, 
only the trustee may pass transfer subject to the provisions of section 5 of the 
Insolvency Act."31 The trustees refused to agree to the transfer.32 
3.2  Arguments and judgment in Edkins v Registrar of Deeds 
In the court a quo, Edkins contended that Mthethwa, the insolvent, was and should 
have been aware at all stages of the attachment of the immovable property in 
question and of the subsequent sale in execution. Despite this he purposely decided 
to wait until after the conclusion of the sale in execution before he lodged an 
application for the voluntary surrender of his estate, and before the notices 
connected with it were published. 
On the other hand, the trustees argued that section 20 of the Insolvency Act 
provided that the ownership of the immovable property sold in execution vested in 
them upon their appointment as trustees, and that a sale in execution did not affect 
this.33 They also contended that the right to claim transfer of the property prior to 
sequestration was an unsecured personal right and, when a concursus creditorum 
                                        
31  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 4.4. S 5 of the Insolvency Act provides that, after publication of 
a notice of surrender in the Government Gazette, it is unlawful to sell any property in the estate 
which has been attached under a writ of execution or similar process, unless the sheriff could 
not have known of the publication. However, the court or, where the value of the property does 
not exceed R5 000, the Master may order the sale of the attached property to proceed and how 
the proceeds of the sale must be applied. 
32  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 5. 
33  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 5. 
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came into existence upon sequestration, they were required to treat the claims of 
creditors according to their status before sequestration. They further argued that the 
principles pertaining to executory contracts (uncompleted contracts) which are not 
specifically dealt with by the Insolvency Act are by analogy also applicable to 
uncompleted sales in execution. Therefore, they argued, they themselves and not 
the Registrar of Deeds were obliged to deal with the fate of the immovable property. 
They consequently elected not to transfer the immovable property into the 
applicant's name. 
The court, per Moshidi J,34 granted the relief sought by Edkins. It found that the fact 
that the sale agreement was concluded before the publication of the notice of 
surrender suggested that it was a lawful sale that did not conflict with the provisions 
of section 5(1) of the Act. It reasoned that the insolvent, knowing that Absa Bank 
had foreclosed on the loan and that sale in execution was pending, deliberately 
waited until after the sale to publish his intention to surrender his estate. It found 
that the insolvent had no authority over the property and that the trustees had no 
right to prevent the transfer of the property into the name of Edkins. In the 
circumstances, the court held that Edkins was entitled to the order sought.35 
3.3  Arguments and judgment in Fourie v Edkins 
In Fourie v Edkins, the Supreme Court of Appeal, in a unanimous judgment delivered 
by Shongwe JA, pointed out that section 5(1) of the Act, upon which Edkins' 
application in the court a quo had been premised, envisages a situation where the 
sheriff36 or the insolvent debtor or any person, for that matter, is prohibited from 
selling any property of the estate after37 publication of the notice of surrender, 
unless he could not have known of the publication.38 Shongwe JA explained that the 
purpose of section 5(1) is to protect creditors against anyone, including the insolvent 
                                        
34  Relying heavily on De Jager v Balju van die Hooggeregshof, Bloemfontein-Wes 2010 ZAFSHC 90 
(4 June 2010). 
35  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 26. 
36  Who is the one who is charged with the execution of the writ. 
37  Authors' emphasis. 
38  Fourie v Edkins para 12. 
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debtor, from dissipating the assets of the estate. The appeal court decided, 
however, that section 5(1) was irrelevant to the facts of this case, as the sale had 
taken place before39 the publication of the notice of surrender. Shongwe JA ruled 
that the founding affidavit showed that Edkins had been advised, before the 
publication of the notice of surrender, that the execution of the sale had been 
finalised, notwithstanding the fact that transfer of the property had not taken place. 
But, the court observed, the signing of the deed of sale, per se, and the compliance 
with the conditions of sale are insufficient to complete the execution of the sale.40 
Shongwe JA stated that the crisp question concerned the principle that upon the 
sequestration of a debtor's estate it vests first in the Master and thereafter, once 
they are appointed, in the trustees.41 Citing Simpson v Klein,42 Liquidators Union and 
Rhodesia Wholesale Ltd v Brown & Co,43 Syfrets Bank Ltd v Sheriff of the Supreme 
Court, Durban Central; Schoerie v Syfrets Bank Ltd,44 and Shalala v Bowman,45 
Shongwe JA stated that the estate includes immovable property sold in execution 
but not yet transferred at the date of sequestration.46 He found relevance in section 
20(1)(c) and (2)(a) of the Act, which is set out above.47 
The court ruled that the meaning and effect of section 20(1)(c), read with section 
20(2)(a), which "deals with what constitutes the property of the insolvent [sic] at the 
date of the sequestration", is that: 
… as soon as the sheriff becomes aware of the sequestration of the debtor's estate, 
he is duty-bound or enjoined by operation of law to stay the execution, unless the 
court otherwise directs.48 
Shongwe JA went on to state that: 
                                        
39  Authors' emphasis. 
40  Fourie v Edkins para 12. 
41  Fourie v Edkins para 13. 
42  Simpson v Klein 408E-H. 
43  Liquidators Union and Rhodesia Wholesale Ltd v Brown & Co 1922 AD 549 558-559. 
44  Syfrets Bank Ltd v Sheriff of the Supreme Court, Durban Central; Schoerie v Syfrets Bank Ltd 
1997 1 SA 764 (D) 772C-I. 
45  Shalala v Bowman 1989 4 SA 900 (W) 905E-G (hereafter Shalala v Bowman). 
46  Fourie v Edkins) para 13. 
47  See para 2 above. 
48  Fourie v Edkins para 15. 
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The effect of … [section 20](1) is to confer the power or control (and not 
ownership) of the property on the master and subsequently the trustee and to 
dispossess or remove control of the property from the sheriff unless the court 
otherwise directs. This simply means any interested party (including the execution 
purchaser) may approach the court to direct otherwise. Logically the interested 
party must place facts before the court to persuade it to direct otherwise.49 
Returning to the facts, Shongwe JA stated that Edkins should have based his 
application in the court a quo, for an order directing the transfer of the property into 
his name notwithstanding the supervening voluntary surrender of the insolvent 
estate, on section 20(1)(c) and not on section 5(1) of the Insolvency Act.50 He found 
that Edkins failed to place facts before the court a quo to persuade it to direct 
otherwise than to stay the sale in execution.51 Shongwe JA cited Master of the 
Supreme Court v Nevsky52 where Innes CJ concluded that: 
                                        
49  Fourie v Edkins para 15. In this respect it is submitted that there is a difference between 
individuals, on the one hand, and companies, on the other, regarding the effect of 
insolvency/liquidation on the ownership of the property in question. S 339 of the Companies Act  
61 of 1973, which applies by virtue of s9 of Schedule 5 to the Companies Act 71 of 2008, 
provides that "In the winding-up of a company unable to pay its debts the provisions of the law 
relating to insolvency shall, insofar as they are applicable, be applied mutatis mutandis in respect 
of any matter not specially provided for by this Act" and s 361(1)of the Companies Act 61 of 
1973 reads that "In any winding-up by the Court, all the property of the company concerned 
shall be deemed to be in the custody and under the control of the Master until a provisional 
liquidator has been appointed and has assumed office". Upon the liquidation of insolvent 
companies, dominium in the property of the company remains with the company. Only the 
custody and control passes to the Master until a provisional liquidator has been appointed and 
has assumed office. At the sequestration of an individual's estate, dominium of the debtor's 
property passes to the Master and ultimately settles upon the trustee of the insolvent estate. 
Here one must bear in mind that Shalala v Bowman, amongst other cases, was referred to by 
Shongwe JA in Fourie v Edkins. Although the facts of Shalala v Bowman and Fourie v Edkins are 
fairly similar, they relate to company liquidation and the sequestration of an individual 
respectively. This distinction is crucial in relation to the effect that liquidation/sequestration has 
on the property in the relevant estates. Also see Kelly 2000 SA Merc LJ 373, 374, 379. When 
considering the passing of dominium in the context of this discussion it is submitted that one 
must distinguish between the passing of dominium under circumstances of solvency, on the one 
hand, and the passing of dominium under insolvent circumstances on the other. If immovable 
property is sold in execution of a debt while the debtor's estate has not been sequestrated, the 
dominium remains in the debtor who can up to the last moment before the actual sale redeem 
his attached property (see Liquidators Union and Rhodesia Wholesale Ltd v Brown & Co 1922 AD 
549 558-559). If the latter sale, however, runs its expected course, transfer of dominium occurs 
with delivery (transfer) pursuant to and in terms of the sale. But when insolvency intervenes (in 
respect of individuals' estates), dominium of all property that forms part of an insolvent estate 
passes to the Master (and ultimately, the trustee) at the moment of sequestration (see De 
Villiers v Delta Cables 15B-D). 
50  Fourie v Edkins para 16. 
51  Authors' emphasis. 
52  Master of the Supreme Court v Nevsky 1907 TS 268. 
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The determining considerations are that the proceeds are not likely to be sufficient 
to satisfy the two bonds, and that there is nobody likely to be benefited by holding 
over the sale.53 
Shongwe JA then said that any interested party must show that it would be in the 
interests of the body of creditors (concursus creditorum) to direct otherwise than to 
stay the execution sale. The court explained that, in the present case, Edkins had 
bought the property for only R530 000, which was about half of the amount of the 
bond of R1 100 000 held by Absa Bank over the property. Further, Edkins had failed 
to place before the court a quo any valuation of the property and also had not 
declared if there were any other creditors of the insolvent estate. The court 
considered this to be detrimental to his case, bearing in mind that Edkins bore the 
onus of proof in this regard. However, Shongwe JA confirmed that in exceptional 
circumstances, and only if the interests of the other creditors of the estate would not 
be adversely affected, the court has the authority to order the sheriff to proceed 
with the sale and registration of the property in the name of the execution 
purchaser.54  
With specific reference again to Simpson v Klein, Shongwe JA emphasised the 
principle that the ownership of attached immovable property does not pass during 
the sale in execution, but only upon the formal registration of transfer to a 
purchaser. He repeated that: 
The effect of the sequestration in terms of section 20(1)(a) is to divest the 
insolvent of his estate, not his ownership. Ownership remains with the insolvent 
debtor, but the control vests in the master.55 
Shongwe JA said that the court a quo mentioned section 20(1)(c) but did not deal 
with the effects of the supervening sequestration, probably because the application 
in the court a quo had been couched in terms of section 5(1). He thought that this 
had unfortunately created the erroneous impression in the court a quo that the 
                                        
53  Fourie v Edkins para 17 with reference to Master of the Supreme Court v Nevsky 1907 TS 268 
269. 
54  Fourie v Edkins para 17. 
55  Fourie v Edkins para 18. See, however, n 49 above. 
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application turned solely on the provisions of section 5(1).56 Shongwe JA agreed with 
the trustees' contention that the court a quo misdirected itself because it did not 
deal with the substitution of a pignus judiciale by a concursus creditorum and the 
consequent effect on the position of section 20(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act. He also 
agreed with the trustees' submission that the unreported judgment in De Jager v 
Balju, on which the court a quo had relied heavily, did not concern a supervening 
sequestration and was therefore distinguishable, and in fact irrelevant, in the 
circumstances.57 
Shongwe JA stated: 
I therefore conclude that upon publication of a notice of surrender in terms of 
section 4(1) of the Act, the provisions of section 20(1)(c) and (2)(a) immediately 
come into operation. The effect thereof is that control of the insolvent estate vests 
in the master until a trustee has been appointed, and that thereafter the estate will 
vest in the trustee. Ownership, however, remains with the insolvent debtor. (See 
Liquidators Union, Simpson, Shalala etc, supra.)58 
He confirmed that once a concursus creditorum has been established, nothing may 
be done by any creditor to alter the rights of the other creditors.59 Then the rights of 
the general body of creditors have to be taken into consideration. In other words, no 
transaction can then be entered into with regard to estate matters by a single 
creditor to the prejudice of the general body of creditors. Finally, the court ruled that 
the bona fides of the creditors or execution purchaser are irrelevant, as are the mala 
fides of the insolvent debtor.60 
                                        
56  Fourie v Edkins para 18. 
57  Fourie v Edkins para 19. 
58  Fourie v Edkins para 20 with reference to cases cited in para 13 of the judgment, which are also 
mentioned above in para 3.3. All of these cases pre-dated the judgment in De Villiers v Delta 
Cables. See the further comments in this regard at para 4.4 below. It is also submitted that the 
first sentence of the passage quoted is incorrect in that it is upon the granting of a sequestration 
order that s 20 immediately comes into operation and not upon the publication of a notice of 
surrender. See comments at 3.4 below. Also see n 49 above. 
59  See Fourie v Edkins para 20 with reference to Walker v Syfret 1911 AD 141 160 and Taylor and 
Steyn v Koekemoer 1982 1 SA 374 (T). 
60  Fourie v Edkins para 20. It should be noted that this will not be the position where the 
publication of the notice of surrender is done merely to stifle the sale in execution. For example, 
in the recent decision in Firstrand Bank Limited v Consumer Guardian Services 2014 ZAWCHC 27 
(4 March 2014) para 8 Binns-Ward J stated: "To use the notice procedure for a purpose for 
which it is not intended is to misrepresent the debtor's position to the legally interested third 
parties and, when there are pending sales in execution involved, to cause s 5(1) of the Act to 
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The court consequently upheld the appeal, finding in favour of the trustees. 
3.4  Comments 
It is submitted that the outcome of the Edkins matter is correct. However, in each of 
the Edkins judgments the court erred in respect of its conception of the status of the 
ownership of the property of an insolvent estate. As discussed above,61 against a 
background of conflict between various judicial approaches and differing academic 
opinions,62 the Appellate Division, in De Villiers v Delta Cables, a judgment reported 
in 1992, held that the ownership of the assets in the insolvent estate passes to the 
trustee upon his appointment. This statement of the position was accepted by the 
Constitutional Court in Harksen v Lane. However, surprisingly, this principle was not 
applied nor was there any reference whatsoever to De Villiers v Delta Cables in 
either of the Edkins judgments. The reasoning in each of these judgments may be 
subjected to criticism on this score. 
For instance, in Edkins v Registrar of Deeds, Moshidi J considered,63 inter alia, rule 
46(13) of the Uniform Rules of Court, which provides as follows: 
(13) The sheriff … shall give transfer to the purchaser against payment of the 
purchase money and upon performance of the conditions of sale and may for that 
purpose do anything necessary to effect registration of transfer, and anything so 
done by him shall be as valid and effectual as if he were the owner of the property. 
It was argued on behalf of Edkins that rule 46(13) makes provision for two distinct 
transactions with regard to execution levied against immovable property, namely the 
sale of the property and its transfer.64 The emphasis, the court stated, is on the word 
"shall", which suggests that it is peremptory for the sheriff to give transfer to the 
purchaser once the latter has complied with the conditions of sale.65 In relation to 
                                                                                                                          
operate in circumstances in which it was clearly not intended to apply; in other words to act not 
only contra legem, but also in fraudem legis. The misrepresentation is clearly mala fide when it 
occurs in the context of a deliberate misuse of the statutory provisions." 
61  See para 2 above. 
62  See generally Evans Assets of Insolvent Estates; Evans 1996 TSAR 719; Evans 1998 Stell LR 359. 
Also see works and cases cited in para 2 above. 
63  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 6. 
64  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 8. 
65  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 7. 
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this, the court also considered the judgment in Simpson v Klein,66 but distinguished 
the case on the basis that Edkins had complied with all of his obligations under the 
sale agreement67 whereas, in Simpson v Klein the applicant had paid a deposit, taken 
occupation, and had been paying monthly instalments. However, it is submitted that, 
on the strength of the rule established in De Villiers v Delta Cables, ownership of 
property passes to the trustee of the insolvent estate and the matter should have 
been put to rest there and then in favour of the trustees. Clearly Mthethwa's estate 
had been sequestrated, the immovable property had in terms of section 20 become 
part of the insolvent estate, and it was no longer correct or prudent for the court to 
apply or dissect any rules of court, or section 5 of the Insolvency Act, or to consider 
the De Jager v Balju judgment. 
Moshidi J held that section 20 (and section 5) must be construed according to the 
plain meaning of their language unless this leads to some absurdity, inconsistency, 
hardship or anomaly. With this in mind, the court found that the legislature could not 
have intended to nullify a valid sale in execution which had occurred before an 
insolvent surrendered his estate in terms of section 4(1) of the Insolvency Act.68 
Moshidi J pointed out that there was no evidence that the estate of the insolvent had 
vested in the Master at the time of the sale in execution before the appointment of 
the trustees, and the applicant and the sheriff were not aware of the publication of 
the insolvent's notice to surrender his estate, which occurred after the sale in 
execution. It is submitted that, if the court had been aware of the precedent 
established in De Villiers v Delta Cables, it would have realised that the moment the 
sequestration order was granted the immovable property had, by virtue of section 
20 of the Insolvency Act, vested in the Master and later in the trustee. Further, it 
would have been clear that dominium in the property had passed to the trustee. 
In Edkins v Registrar of Deeds, the court viewed the insolvent's conduct as mala 
fide. This was on the basis that it could reasonably be accepted that the insolvent 
                                        
66  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 8. 
67  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 8. 
68  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 14. 
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had known about the attachment and the imminent sale in execution and yet he 
waited until after the completion of the sale in execution before deciding and 
publishing the notice of intention to surrender his estate. However, it is submitted 
that the mala fides of the debtor has no effect on the status of the property once 
sequestration has intervened.69 In this respect, the Supreme Court of Appeal's 
judgment in Fourie v Edkins was correct: it ruled that the bona fides of the creditors 
or execution purchaser are irrelevant, as are the mala fides of the insolvent debtor.70 
Turning to a different criticism which may be levelled against the Edkins judgments, 
in the court a quo counsel for Edkins relied extensively on De Jager v Balju, the facts 
of which are similar to those in the Edkins matter in some ways only. The case of De 
Jager v Balju concerned an application by the trustees of a trust, Remi's Property 
Trust, for an interdict against the transfer of certain immovable property to an 
execution purchaser. In that case, after the sale in execution of the immovable 
property registered in the name of the trust, its trustees published in the 
Government Gazette and a relevant newspaper a notice to surrender the estate of 
the trust in terms of section 4(1) of the Insolvency Act. Their attorneys of record 
consequently addressed a letter to the sheriff informing him of the notice to 
surrender the estate and requesting him not to proceed with the registration of the 
transfer of the immovable property into the name of the execution purchaser. 
The attorneys representing the respondent mortgagee bank had adopted the stance, 
which was conveyed to the sheriff, that the publication of the notice to surrender 
in terms of section 4(1) of the Insolvency Act only prohibited a sale in execution 
after the publication of the notice, and did not prohibit a transfer of property in 
which the sale in execution occurred prior to the publication of the notice to 
surrender. Hence application was made for the interdict. The court, per Van Zyl J, 
                                        
69  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 14. 
70  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 20. But see the comment in the recent decision in Firstrand 
Bank Limited v Consumer Guardian Services (Pty) Ltd 2014 ZAWCHC 27 (4 March 2014) in n 60 
above. 
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dismissed the application. He made findings on several issues pertinent to the Edkins 
matter.71 
With regard to the ownership of the immovable property and with reference to 
Simpson v Klein72 in De Jager v Balju, Van Zyl J had ruled that although, before 
transfer, ownership vested in Remi's Property Trust, that did not per se confer any 
right or prima facie right on the trustees of Remi's Property Trust to prevent the 
transfer of the property. The reason for this was that the trustees of Remi's Property 
Trust had no authority ("seggenskap") over the property with regard to its sale in 
execution by public auction.73 Based on this, in the Edkins matter counsel for Edkins 
argued that the insolvent's ownership of the immovable property - the property was 
still registered in his name - did not confer any right on him (ie, the insolvent 
Mthethwa). Consequently, so the argument went, whatever entitlement the insolvent 
had did not confer on the trustees of his insolvent estate any rights to deal with the 
immovable property. 
However, on this point it is submitted that if the insolvent still owned the property it 
had to be regarded as part of the insolvent estate by virtue of section 20 of the 
Insolvency Act and the precedent established in De Villiers v Delta Cables. 
Furthermore, the court in Edkins v Registrar of Deeds failed to grasp the significance 
of the distinguishing fact that in De Jager v Balju the estate of the Remi's Property 
Trust had not yet been sequestrated but only the notice of surrender had been 
published. On the assumption that the reasoning in De Jager v Balju is correct, the 
publication of the notice of surrender caused section 5 of the Insolvency Act to be 
relevant and applicable. However, in the Edkins matter the debtor's estate had 
already been sequestrated and therefore section 20 had become immediately 
applicable and, in terms of section 20(2)(a), the immovable property in question, 
which was still in the hands of the sheriff, had become part of the insolvent estate 
and vested in the Master and thereafter the trustee. This significant distinction 
                                        
71  Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 15.4. 
72  The reference was to Simpson v Klein 411B. 
73  See Edkins v Registrar of Deeds para 15.5. 
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should have put an end to any further reference to the judgment in De Jager v 
Balju, and it is submitted that the result is that the ruling in Edkins v Registrar of 
Deeds was incorrect. 
Turning to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Fourie v Edkins, it is 
submitted that the outcome of the case is correct. However, as indicated above,74 
the appeal court erred in its ruling in respect of the passing of the ownership of 
property of an insolvent estate. First, Shongwe JA incorrectly stated that it is upon 
publication of a notice of surrender in terms of section 4(1) of the Act that the 
provisions of section 20(1)(c) and (2)(a) immediately come into operation.75 It is 
submitted that, from the wording of section 20, clearly it is only upon the 
sequestration of a debtor's estate that its provisions apply to the situation. Another 
incorrect aspect is the statement that the effect of section 20(1) is "to confer the 
power or control (and not ownership) of the property on the master and 
subsequently the trustee".76 Citing certain reported judgments, as mentioned 
above,77 Shongwe JA stated that "ownership … remains with the insolvent debtor".78 
This, it is submitted, is also wrong. 
Although the outcome in Fourie v Edkins is correct - the position is that the trustees 
were indeed entitled to prevent the transfer of the immovable property in question 
to Edkins - this statement of the position, without any reference to De Villiers v Delta 
Cables, and with reference only to judgments reported before De Villiers v Delta 
Cables, in which the Appellate Division resolved the issue regarding the passing of 
the ownership of the property of the insolvent estate to the trustee, is incorrect. The 
importance of applying precedent of this nature consistently and correctly, it is 
submitted, will be illustrated in the following discussion of the third recent judgment, 
                                        
74  See para 3.2 above.  
75  Fourie v Edkins para 20. The notice of surrender may be withdrawn, or the application may not 
be granted by the court. Also see also the reference to the Firstrand Bank v Consumer Guardian 
Services judgment in notes 62 and 72 above, where notices of surrender were published without 
the intention to surrender the debtor's estate. Under such circumstances neither the control nor 
the ownership of the property can pass to the Master or a trustee. 
76  Fourie v Edkins paras 15, 20. 
77  See Fourie v Edkins para 13. As pointed out above, all of these cases pre-dated the De Villiers v 
Delta Cables judgment. 
78  Fourie v Edkins para 20. See n 49 above. 
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in which, it is submitted, the principles regarding the ownership of the property of an 
insolvent estate were incorrectly applied. This concerns the court's judgment in 
Motala v Moller79 in respect of the status of the property of the solvent spouse. 
4 Motala v Moller 
4.1  The facts 
In this case an insolvent debtor's wife, to whom he was married out of community of 
property, sold immovable property that was registered in her name, to a third party, 
Moller. The sale had been concluded between the issuing of the provisional order for 
the sequestration of her husband's estate and the final order.80 The insolvent went 
by the name of Segal, while his wife entered into the transaction for the sale of her 
immovable property under her name of Stein. To finance the purchase price, a 
mortgage bond was registered for Moller in favour of Nedbank (Pty) Ltd 
("Nedbank"). The trustees of the husband's insolvent estate sought an order 
declaring the transfer of the ownership of that property sold by the wife to be void. 
The trustees also contended that the solvent wife (Stein) remained the registered 
owner of the property she had sold and that the Registrar of Deeds should be 
directed to amend his records to reflect her, and not the third party purchaser, 
Moller, as the registered owner. They also argued that a consequence of the facts 
was that the bond that was registered in favour of Nedbank was void. The 
application was opposed by Moller, Stein and Nedbank.81 
                                        
79  Motala v Moller (GSJ) unreported case number 32654/11 (GSJ) of 11 September 2013. For a 
detailed discussion and comment on this judgment within the context of s 21 of the Insolvency 
Act, see Evans 2014 THRHR. Some of the observations in that article regarding the Motala 
judgment are also included in this contribution. 
80  The provisional order was granted on 23 April 2008. The sale of the immovable property by Stein 
to Moller was concluded on 20 July 2008, and the final order was granted on 30 July 2008. See 
Motala v Moller paras 3.2, 3.5. 
81  Stein and Nedbank did not raise separate arguments of their own, but "embraced" those put 
forward by Moller; see Motala v Moller para 10. Stein had, however, given notice of her intention 
to raise certain questions of law regarding inter alia her capacity to sell and/or transfer the 
property to Moller in the circumstances, and whether the sale or transfer fell automatically to be 
set aside or were void; see Motala v Moller para 7. Nedbank also brought a counter-application, 
in the event of the trustees' application being granted, for an order compelling Moller to pay the 
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An existing mortgage bond had been passed over the property by Stein in favour of 
a company (Rodel Financial Services (Pty) Ltd ("Rodel")). The trustees argued that 
this latter mortgage bond actually secured the debt of the insolvent.82 When the 
property was transferred the purchase price was paid and the bond in favour of 
Rodel was cancelled.83 The proceeds of the mortgage bond passed in favour of 
Nedbank were used to discharge the balance owing on the Rodel mortgage bond.84 
4.2  The arguments 
The trustees contended that the effect of section 21(1) of the Act was to divest Stein 
of her capacity to deal with the property or to grant real rights in it, so Moller had 
not acquired any right or title to the property and the registration of the mortgage 
bond had been void. The trustees based their argument on the decisions in two 
cases:85 De Villiers v Delta Cables, which the trustees contended disposed of the 
matter, and Gainsford v Tiffski Property Investments (Pty) Ltd.86 
On the other hand, Moller contended that he was bona fide, being unaware of the 
sequestration of Stein's husband's estate, and further that the insolvent estate had 
not been impoverished by the disputed transaction. It was argued on his behalf that 
the trustees were estopped from asserting their rights of ownership as they had not 
registered the required caveat against the title deed of the property.87 The argument 
was also made that the effect of section 21(1) results in the transfer of the property 
                                                                                                                          
full balance owing in terms of the mortgage bond registered in its favour; see Motala v Moller 
para 5. 
82  The trustees argued that Stein actually held the property for the insolvent as nominee, but the 
court did not make a decision regarding the latter allegation as "nothing turn[ed]… on this". See 
Motala v Moller para 3.4 n 2. 
83  Motala v Moller paras 3.6, 3.7. 
84  The sale price of R2 550 000 was considered the fair market value of the property. The balance 
owing on the Rodel bond was R2 820 000; see Motala v Moller paras 3.5, 3.8, 3.9. 
85  Motala v Moller para 8. 
86  Gainsford v Tiffski Property Investments (Pty) Ltd 2012 3 SA 35 (SCA) (hereafter Gainsford v 
Tiffski). See Gainsford v Tiffski Order paras 1, 2 where the Supreme Court of Appeal declared a 
transfer of immovable property void and ordered the Registrar of Deeds to amend the record 
reflecting title and to cancel the record of a mortgage bond registered against the property. 
87  See Motala v Moller para 9.1. S 18B(1) of the Insolvency Act provides for the trustee to have 
such a caveat registered. 
RG EVANS AND L STEYN PER / PELJ 2014(17)6 
2767 
 
being "voidable", not "void".88 Moller further argued that section 25(4) of the 
Insolvency Act denied them the relief applied for.89 
4.3  The judgment 
The court, per Myburgh AJ, stated that De Villiers v Delta Cables could be 
distinguished on the basis that the facts were quite different and that estoppel was 
neither considered nor relevant. It also stated that because De Villiers v Delta Cables 
had been decided prior to the enactment of section 25(4) of the Insolvency Act, the 
effect of section 25(4) in relation to section 21(1) of the Act was not considered.90 
Myburgh AJ also regarded Gainsford v Tiffski as not being applicable because it 
concerned recovery by company liquidators of company assets which had been 
transferred less than six months prior to the liquidation of the company otherwise 
than in the ordinary course of business, without the transfer having been advertised, 
and which turned on the meaning to be attributed to section 34(1) of the Insolvency 
Act.91 
But the trustees' argument that the effect of section 21(1) of the Act "is to divest the 
spouse of an insolvent of the capacity to deal with her property" was ruled against 
by Myburgh AJ as follows:92 
As I have indicated, the central thread of the Applicants' case was that the 
effect of S 21 (1) of the Act is to divest the spouse of an insolvent of the capacity 
to deal with her property. That being so, so the argument went, there was 
nothing else to consider -  caedit quaestio. Again, I do not agree. On the 
contrary, it is well settled that notwithstanding the clear language of S 21(1), (viz. 
                                        
88  Moller argued that even if the sale were void, the applicants would be entitled to receive only 
what the seller, Stein, had parted with, which was the immovable property over which a third 
party held a bond as security for repayment of an outstanding sum, in terms of a loan 
agreement, which exceeded the fair market value of the property. See Motala v Moller paras 6, 
9.2, 9.3, 9.4. 
89  See Motala v Moller para 9.5. S 25(4) of the Insolvency Act is set out in n 99 below. 
90  Motala v Moller para 12. 
91  Motala v Moller para 13. Myburgh AJ also distinguished Gainsford v Tiffski on the basis that, in 
that case, it appeared to be common cause that the purchaser and the financing bank were 
aware that the transfer was being effected other than in the ordinary course of the company's 
business and that the sale had not been advertised and that they had not acted bona fide in 
concluding the transaction. See Motala v Moller para 14, with reference to Gainsford v Tiffski 
paras 40, 41. 
92  Motala v Moller paras 15-16. 
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'to vest in'), there is nothing in law which prohibits the spouse of an insolvent from 
dealing with her property, and also that any alienation by her will be valid unless 
and until the insolvent's trustee successfully assails it. If the trustee does not do 
that, then the transfer will remain valid with the result that the original defect in the 
transaction is, in effect, made good. The position is analogous with, if not identical 
to, that which pertains to transfers of assets in the circumstances described in … 
[s]ections 23(2) and 34(1) of the Act. 
In terms of S 34(1) of the Act, an affected transfer 'shall be void as 
against (the insolvent's) creditors for a period of six months after such 
transfer, and shall be void as against the trustee of his estate, if his estate 
is sequestrated at any time within the said period'. This does not however 
connote invalidity in the ordinary sense. 
Myburgh AJ noted that, with dispositions which may be set aside under sections 26, 
29, 30 and 31, and when the assets of a trader are transferred as envisaged by 
section 34(1) of the Insolvency Act, the trustee is not compelled to have them set 
aside. If he does not apply to set the disposition aside, it remains in force.93 He 
adopted the approach that these principles applied also to the transaction between 
Stein and Moller.94 Myburgh AJ concluded that such transactions are "provisionally 
valid" or "voidable" rather than "void".95 
Myburgh AJ apparently considered that there may be merit in an argument based on 
estoppel.96 However, in the absence of estoppel having been expressly pleaded and 
of an allegation and proof of a representation negligently made, as opposed to facts 
which were merely "strongly suggestive of negligence" on the part of the trustees 
"in not causing a caveat to be registered against the property", it was held that the 
defence of estoppel could not succeed.97 
In respect of section 25(4) of the Insolvency Act the court held that section 21(1) 
"does not simply vest the spouse's assets in the trustee of the insolvent, but does so 
                                        
93  Motala v Moller para 16. The judge relied on dicta in the judgment in Galaxy Melodies (Pty) Ltd v 
Dally 1975 4 SA 736 (A) 743B, a case which concerned s 34(1) of the Insolvency Act. 
94  Motala v Moller para 17. 
95  Motala v Moller para 17. 
96  Myburgh AJ found significant similarities between the facts before the court and those in Oriental 
Products (Pty) Ltd v Pegma 178 Investments Trading CC 2011 2 SA 508 (SCA). This was 
especially because "the representation relied on consisted of the failure of the true owner to take 
steps to ensure that the records of the Registrar of Deeds reflected it as the owner of the 
property in question when it had reason to believe that the records might have reflected 
someone other than the owner". See Motala v Moller para 20. 
97  Motala v Moller para 23. 
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'as if it were the property of the sequestrated estate.'" And "[i]t follows that the 
rights, powers and obligations of the trustee in respect of the spouse's property are 
(leaving aside the statutory provisos and exceptions) the same as those which apply 
in respect of the insolvent estate".98 So Myburgh AJ held that this transaction 
between Stein and Moller fell within the provisions of section 25(4) of the Insolvency 
Act,99 which "deals specifically with the rights of trustees relative to disposals of 
immovable property". Consequently, the trustees would have to resort to section 
25(4) for a remedy, but on the facts in this judgment, could not succeed therein,100 
so their application before Myburgh AJ failed. 
Myburgh AJ held that section 25(4): 
[W]as enacted precisely in order to deal with the potentially inequitable 
consequences which could follow from orders declaring transfers to have been void 
ab initio without addressing the circumstances in which such transfers took place, 
or the benefits which the insolvent or his estate may have derived from or as a 
result of such transfer101  
and that section 25(4) was born by way of a 1993 amendment to the Insolvency Act 
against the background of the decision in De Villiers v Delta Cables. He found the 
aforementioned interpretation consistent with: 
... the scheme and purpose of the Act, which is, in general, to preserve the 
estate for the benefit of the insolvent's creditors and, in appropriate 
circumstances, to enable the trustee to recover assets which were disposed of 
in a manner which adversely affected the estate and hence the interests of the 
creditors. Thus, subsection (c) limits the trustee's right of recourse against 
                                        
98  Motala v Moller para 24. 
99   Motala v Moller para 25. Section 25(4) provides: "If a person who is or was insolvent unlawfully 
disposes of immovable property or a right to immovable property which forms part of his 
insolvent estate, the trustee may, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (3), recover the 
value of the property or right so disposed of – (a) from the insolvent or former insolvent; (b) 
from any person who, knowing such property or right to be part of the insolvent estate, acquired 
such property or right from the insolvent or former insolvent; or (c) from any person who 
acquired such property or right from the insolvent or former insolvent without giving sufficient 
value in return, in which case the amount so recovered shall be the difference between the value 
of the property or right and the value given in return". 
100  Motala v Moller paras 26-33. The court held that subsection 25(4)(a) was clearly not applicable 
in the circumstances, and that the trustees were precluded from obtaining relief under s 25(4)(b) 
or (c) because the purchaser Moller was ignorant of the sequestration of the estate of Stein's 
husband and had paid a fair market value for the property. 
101  Motala v Moller para 30. 
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an innocent purchaser I transferee to the difference between the value 
of the property or right and any value given in return.102 
Myburgh AJ explained that, while section 21(1) of the Insolvency Act "determines 
whether or not a transaction or transfer may potentially be set aside, a trustee has, 
in relation to transfers of real rights in immovable property, to frame his case in 
accordance with … [section] 25(4)" and must therefore make and prove the 
allegations required by that subsection, which is not "simply … an additional optional 
remedy".103 
In the result, the court dismissed the trustees' application with costs.104 
4.4  Comments 
A number of comments may be made in relation to and criticisms levelled at the 
judgment in Motala v Moller. First, it is submitted that, contrary to Myburgh AJ's 
view that the facts in Motala v Moller and in De Villiers v Delta Cables were different, 
comparing the factual circumstances in each case reveals remarkable similarities. It 
is submitted that the court should have applied section 21(1) of the Insolvency Act 
in line with the precedent established by the Appellate Division in De Villiers v Delta 
Cables and endorsed by the Constitutional Court for the purposes of its judgment in 
Harksen v Lane. The effect is that, upon the provisional sequestration order being 
granted, dominium in the property of Stein, the solvent spouse, vested in the 
trustees.  
It is further submitted that the court in Motala v Moller incorrectly compared the 
position where a solvent spouse has disposed of property which vested in the 
trustees by virtue of section 21(1) with the position in circumstances regulated by 
section 23(2) or by sections 26, 29, 30 or 31 or by section 34(1) of the Insolvency 
Act. In each situation the wording of the section is different, and one should not 
simply apply analogies and ignore the plain meaning of the words contained in the 
provision. The setting aside of dispositions in terms of sections 26, 29, 30 or 31, or 
                                        
102  Motala v Moller para 31. 
103  Motala v Moller para 33. 
104  Motala v Moller para 35. 
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sequestration rendering the transfer of assets void in terms of section 34, occurs 
only in respect of dispositions and transfers made (directly or indirectly) by the 
insolvent himself.105 Clearly these provisions do not apply to dispositions made or the 
transfer of assets by a solvent spouse of property which belonged to him or her prior 
to the sequestration of the estate of the insolvent spouse. Also as far as section 
23(2) is concerned, clearly this provision applies only in respect of transactions 
entered into after sequestration by the insolvent him- or herself.  
In similar vein, section 25(4) explicitly applies where an insolvent himself has 
disposed of immovable property. It is submitted that the wording of the subsection 
cannot justify an interpretation or inference to apply it to dispositions of immovable 
property by solvent spouses. 
As the Appellate Division emphasised in De Villiers v Delta Cables, "[it is important to 
bear in mind that the sequestration of the estate of an insolvent does not bring 
about the sequestration of his or her spouse's estate".106 This statement is 
particularly relevant in the context of the judgment in Motala v Moller: Although 
Myburgh AJ might have been correct in stating that "[i]t follows that the rights, 
powers and obligations of the trustee in respect of the spouse's property are 
(leaving aside the statutory provisos and exceptions) the same as those which apply 
in respect of the insolvent estate"107 in respect of the property of the spouse, it is 
submitted that the same line of thinking cannot apply to the person of the spouse. 
In other words, the solvent spouse cannot be considered an insolvent for the 
purpose of subjecting him or her to the provisions of section 25 of the Insolvency 
Act.  
Ultimately, if De Villiers v Delta Cables had been applied, the transaction would have 
been void, as would have been the registration of the mortgage bond. There would 
have been nothing to set aside. Only if Stein had been able to discharge the onus to 
                                        
105  Meaning that in respect of s 21 and relating to the facts in Motala v Moller, the third party is in 
no way connected to the sequestration proceedings of the insolvent spouse. 
106  De Villiers v Delta Cables 14F-G. 
107  Motala v Moller para 24. 
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obtain the release of the property in terms of either section 21(2) or section 21(4), 
would the transaction have been able to proceed, as she would have been entitled 
freely to dispose of released assets.108 And this would have had nothing to do with 
the insolvent estate. 
This judgment illustrates the practical implications that can result from the attempt 
to unravel complicated insolvency legislation when combined with complicated facts, 
particularly section 21 of the Act, which has from its inception been shrouded in 
uncertainty in a myriad of different circumstances and case-law. One is tempted to 
speculate that the outcome of this judgment rested to an extent on fairness instead 
of pure jurisprudence.  
5 Conclusion 
From the discussion in this essay it follows that the status of property that forms 
part of an insolvent estate or which belongs to the solvent spouse at the time of 
sequestration is of considerable importance not only for all parties to a 
sequestration's proceeding, but also to third parties who have nothing to do with it, 
and worse, may not even be aware of being ensnared by the provisions of the 
Insolvency Act until it is too late. 
It has also been shown that the proprietary status of property forming part of an 
insolvent estate and its vesting in the Master of the high court and in the trustee, 
upon the latter's appointment, have been and remain a fountain of debate and 
conflicting court judgments.109 The judgments considered in this discussion are 
evidence of the importance of this subject in practice, and clarity is required 
particularly for third parties who enter into transactions with insolvent persons 
and/or their spouses. The outcome of all these judgments also confirms its 
significance, not only in relation to the trustee's election to litigate for the insolvent 
                                        
108  De Villiers v Delta Cables 14I. 
109  See Joubert 1992 TSAR 699; Evans 1996 TSAR 719; Stander 1996 THRHR 388; Evans 1996 
THRHR 613, Evans 1997 THRHR 71; Evans 1998 Stell LR 359; Evans Assets of Insolvent Estates; 
Bertelsmann et al Mars The Law of Insolvency 212 n 50. Also see Stand 382 Saxonwold CC v 
Kruger 1990 4 SA 317 (T) and Harksen v Lane. 
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estate, but also regarding an election to proceed with or to repudiate executory 
contracts.110 Each judgment held consequences for the advantage to creditors in the 
sense that it either enlarged or depleted the insolvent estate in question, while in De 
Villiers v Delta Cables it affected a creditor's ranking.  
It is submitted that the effect of sequestration on the property of the insolvent and 
on that of the solvent spouse was not correctly or adequately considered in the 
cases discussed. In the Edkins judgments the courts erred in their conception of the 
effect of the vesting provisions contained in the Insolvency Act and the passing of 
ownership to the trustee of the insolvent estate. This is especially apparent in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal's judgment in Fourie v Edkins, which leaves the impression 
that the court is unaware of its own precedent established in De Villiers v Delta 
Cables and accepted and applied by the Constitutional Court in Harksen v Lane. 
Further, it is submitted that failure, in Motala v Moller, to analyse the impact that 
section 21 has on the property of the solvent spouse resulted in an incorrect analysis 
and application of the De Villiers v Delta Cables and, consequently, an incorrect 
interpretation of section 25(4) and its inter-play with section 21 of the Insolvency 
Act. One is tempted to observe that the latter judgment was based purely on 
reasons of equity. 
Be that as it may, these judgments have re-opened the question concerning the 
status of property in insolvent estates, particularly in view of the fact that the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Fourie v Edkins ignored its own precedent on this issue. 
Motala v Moller has also left unanswered questions in respect of the functioning of 
section 21 of the Insolvency Act. It will be interesting to follow developments if this 
decision is taken on appeal. 
  
                                        
110  These are contracts which the insolvent or the solvent spouse, as the case may be, had entered 
into prior to sequestration, but the performance in terms of which had not been completely 
carried out at the time of sequestration. 





Bertelsmann et al Mars The Law of Insolvency 
Bertelsmann E et al Mars The Law of Insolvency in South Africa 9th ed (Juta 
Cape Town 2008) 
Evans 1996 THRHR 
Evans RG "A Critical Analysis of Section 21 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
(Part 1)" 1996 THRHR 613-625 
Evans 1996 TSAR 
Evans RG "Who Owns the Insolvent Estate?" 1996 TSAR 719-724 
Evans 1997 THRHR 
Evans RG "A Critical Analysis of Section 21 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
(Part 2)" 1997 THRHR 71-83 
Evans 1998 Stell LR 
Evans RG "The Constitutionality of Section 21 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 
1936" 1998 Stell LR 359-372 
Evans Assets of Insolvent Estates 
Evans RG A Critical Analysis of Problem Areas in Respect of Assets of 
Insolvent Estates of Individuals (LLD thesis University of Pretoria 2008) 
Evans 2014 THRHR 
Evans RG "Sequestration of the Estate of a Spouse: What Happens to the 
'Property' of the Solvent 'Spouse'?" 2014 THRHR (forthcoming) (document 
available from the authors) 
Joubert 1992 TSAR 
Joubert N "Artikel 21 van die Insolvensiewet: Tyd vir 'n Nuwe Benadering?" 
1992 TSAR 699-706 
RG EVANS AND L STEYN PER / PELJ 2014(17)6 
2775 
 
Kelly 2000 SA Merc LJ 
Kelly M "Proceeding with Transfer where an Execution Sale Took Place Prior 
to Sequestration or Liquidation" 2000 SA Merc LJ  369-381 
Meskin Insolvency Law 
Meskin PH et al Insolvency Law and its Operation in Winding Up (LexisNexis 
Durban 1990-) 
Stander 1996 THRHR 
Stander AL "Die Eienaar van die Bates van die Insolvente Boedel" 1996 
THRHR 388-398 
Case law 
Beddy v Van der Westhuizen 1999 3 SA 913 (SCA) 
De Jager v Balju van die Hooggeregshof, Bloemfontein-Wes 2010 ZAFSHC 90 (4 
June 2010) 
De Villiers v Delta Cables (Pty) Ltd 1992 1 SA 9 (A) 
Edkins v Registrar of Deeds, Johannesburg 2012 6 SA 278 (GSJ) 
Firstrand Bank Limited v Consumer Guardian Services (Pty) Ltd 2014 ZAWCHC 27 (4 
March 2014) 
Fourie v Edkins 2013 6 SA 576 (SCA) 
Gainsford v Tiffski Property Investments (Pty) Ltd 2012 3 SA 35 (SCA) 
Galaxy Melodies (Pty) Ltd v Dally 1975 4 SA 736 (A) 
Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) 
Liquidators Union and Rhodesia Wholesale Ltd v Brown & Co 1922 AD 549 
Master of the Supreme Court v Nevsky 1907 TS 268 
RG EVANS AND L STEYN PER / PELJ 2014(17)6 
2776 
 
Motala v Moller (GSJ) unreported case number 32654/11 (GSJ) of 11 September 
2013 
Oriental Products (Pty) Ltd v Pegma 178 Investments Trading CC 2011 2 SA 508 
(SCA)  
Shalala v Bowman 1989 4 SA 900 (W) 
Simpson v Klein 1987 1 SA 405 (W) 
Stand 382 Saxonwold CC v Kruger 1990 4 SA 317 (T) 
Syfrets Bank Ltd v Sheriff of the Supreme Court, Durban Central; Schoerie v Syfrets 
Bank Ltd 1997 1 SA 764 (D) 
Taylor and Steyn v Koekemoer 1982 1 SA 374 (T) 
Walker v Syfret 1911 AD 141 
Legislation 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
Internet sources 
SALRC 2000 http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj63_insolv_2000apr.pdf 
South African Law Reform Commission 2000 Report on the Review of the Law 
of Insolvency: Draft and Insolvency Bill and Explanatory Memorandum 
(Project 63) http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj63_insolv_2000 
apr.pdf accessed 11 April 2014 
  
RG EVANS AND L STEYN PER / PELJ 2014(17)6 
2777 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
SALRC South African Law Reform Commission 
SA Merc LJ South African Mercantile Law Journal 
Stell LR Stellenbosch Law Review 
THRHR Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
TSAR Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
 
